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論　文
 Substantive Comparison of the Subject Matter of 
Design Right Protection and That of Copyright 
Protection in Japan
—Diff erences in and Characteristics of Their Respective “Creation”—
MOTOYAMA　Masahiro(1)
I.  Groundbreaking nature of the judgment in the TRIPP TRAPP 
case and its consequence
The Intellectual Property High Court judgment in the “TRIPP TRAPP” 
case(2) in 2015 was a groundbreaking judgment for the issue of protection for 
designs of useful articles (applied art) in clearly indicating that the “high level 
of creativeness” criterion should be abandoned as a criterion for copyright 
protection.(3)
The typical interpretation adopted by court judgments before this “TRIPP 
TRAPP” case concerning the eligibility of designs for copyright protection in 
Japan is well-manifested in the 2005 Osaka High Court Judgment in the “Choco 
Egg Figures” case(4).
It is an approach to recognize the eligibility for copyright protection not only 
for individually produced works of artistic craftsmanship, but also for mass-
produced works of applied art. On that basis, it recognizes room for copyright 
protection for such mass-produced works of applied art, if the applied art “has 
independently acquired suffi  cient artistic quality to be the subject of aesthetic 
appreciation, apart from practical utility and functionality, and is evaluated 
by general persons with certain aesthetic sense as having a suffi  cient level of 
aesthetic creativeness to be treated like pure art.”
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In other words, under this interpretation, mass-produced works of applied 
art are not denied eligibility for copyright protection. Nevertheless, their 
protection is not recognized in an unrestricted manner; they are required to 
meet a threshold level of aesthetic creativeness as a criterion for protection. 
Whereas the general criteria for copyright protection do not question the 
level of creativeness, in the case of the copyright protection for applied art, a 
special criterion, “a high level of creativeness,” is required to be satisfi ed, in 
consideration of the relationship with the protection for applied art by design 
right.
The approach to require the “high level of creativeness” criterion for the 
copyright protection for applied art was, theoretically, an interpretation that 
was only valid on the assumption that a continuous and close, systematic 
relationship exists between the former German Design Act (Gesetz betreff end 
das Urheberrecht an Mustern und Modellen vom 11. Januar 1876) and 
the German Copyright Act (two-level theory: Stufentheorie).(5) However, 
the Design Act and the Copyright Act in Japan have no such systematic 
circumstances at all, not only in terms of legislative history, but also in terms 
of the substantive aspect of protection. Therefore, an interpretation that tries 
to address the issue of copyright protection for applied art by applying the 
“high level of creativeness” criterion that is not valid for other categories of 
works, as had been adopted in conventional, typical court judgments, should be 
considered to have theoretically lacked validity in Japan.(6)
Then, if the judgment in the “TRIPP TRAPP” case indicating that the “high 
level of creativeness” criterion should be abandoned were to be assumed as 
the basis, what would the future interpretation of the Copyright Act be with 
regard to protection for the designs of useful articles? Would a consequence be 
derived that copyright protection should be recognized for applied art under 
the general criteria for copyright protection that do not question the level of 
creativeness, with no relevance to the Design Act, which has formed the basic 
standard to date as a system for protecting applied art (design) in Japan since 
its fi rst legislation in 1888?
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At least in logic, the abovementioned judgment in the “TRIPP TRAPP” 
case has no such implication. The proposition indicated by the judgment that 
“application of the ‘high level of creativeness’ criterion—which is not applied 
to other categories of works—to works of applied art should be abandoned” 
merely concerns the criteria for protection to be applied. It is not a preposition 
that further implicates a new approach to the protection for applied art, such as 
that “applied art should be protected by the general creativeness criterion.”(7)
Ⅱ.  What aspects should be studied in examining the validity of 
copyright protection?
In essence, the point that should be examined is the validity of recognizing 
copyright protection for applied art in an unrestrictive manner (general 
recognition of copyrightability).
For examining this validity, detailed arguments have already been presented 
by scholars both for and against copyright protection for applied art, regarding 
detriments caused by copyright protection for applied art and the possibility or 
appropriateness of dealing with them through legal interpretation.
According to a discussion that has comprehensively analyzed these 
arguments, arguments on detriments caused by the copyright protection include 
indication of concerns about infringement of the right of reproduction in 
the case where a commonly available design of a useful article is taken as a 
photograph or recorded on fi lm (Article 21 of the Copyright Act), infringement 
of the right of on-screen presentation in the case where such photograph or fi lm 
is broadcast or transmitted (Article 23, paragraph (1) of the Copyright Act), 
infringement of the right to rent out in the case where the useful article is rented 
out (Article 26-3 of the Copyright Act), or obstruction of design development 
as a result of the eff ects of various rights extending to an act of improving an 
existing design.(8)
Counter to these arguments, on the other hand, scholars taking a proactive 
stance on copyright protection have argued that it will be possible to secure 
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room for development of subsequent designs by taking measures such as 
fl exible interpretation of the provisions on limitations of rights or by limiting 
the scope of protection in correlation to the (high or low) level of creativeness 
of the work. They have developed arguments asserting that it is possible 
to avoid the various detriments associated with recognition of copyright 
protection.(9)
However, these arguments about detriments and those about their 
avoidability both assume the states and features of protection existing under the 
Copyright Act that is currently valid in society, and merely indicate concerns 
about detriments to the states and features of protection under the Copyright 
Act caused by the extension of copyright protection to applied art or argue 
avoidance of those detriments from the viewpoint of states and features of 
protection under the Copyright Act. It cannot be said that these arguments 
evaluate or study what kind of impact the general recognition of the copyright 
protection for applied art would have on the states and features of protection 
under the Design Act that is currently valid, from the viewpoint of states and 
features of protection under the Design Act. It is because the modes of use of 
the designs discussed in the arguments about detriments and those about their 
avoidability are all construed to be modes of use to which a design right does 
not extend.
Specifically, under the Japanese Design Act, acts of “exploitation” of 
a design do not include reproduction of a form of a product in a manner 
detached from the product (Article 2, paragraph (3) of the Design Act). In 
addition, even if the same form is applied to products, the “designs” will 
differ as long as the “products” to which it is designated differ (Article 2, 
paragraph (1) of the Design Act). Therefore, the arguments about detriments 
indicating that infringement of the right of reproduction would be caused 
by taking a photograph of the work or by a similar act, and those about their 
avoidability, are discussing settings unrelated to a design right. The same 
applies to the arguments concerning the right to rent out. An act of renting 
out a product embodying a design is included in acts of “exploitation” of 
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a design, but a design right is construed not to extend to the “leasing” of 
a legally manufactured product, which is assumed in the arguments about 
detriments and those about their avoidability, due to the so-called exhaustion.(10) 
Meanwhile, the arguments about detriments to the moral rights of an author 
are also regarded as discussions on a setting unrelated to the states and features 
of protection under the Design Act, because moral interests equivalent to the 
moral rights of an author are not protected by a design right.
Moreover, the arguments indicating a correlation between the level of 
creativeness and the scope of protection may stand as true as a logic for the 
Copyright Act.(11) However, these arguments on the scope of protection would 
not be regarded as having discussed the impact on the states and features of 
protection under the Design Act either, unless they clarify the fundamental idea 
underlying the demarcation of the scope of protection under the Design Act 
and whether a scope of protection for copyright, which can be adjusted more 
narrowly based on the level of creativeness, may exist in harmony with the 
already formed scope of protection for design right.
It may be assumed that the method of determining copyright infringement is 
characterized by a determination solely based on the commonality in creative 
elements (expressions) between the plaintiff ’s work and the defendant’s work, 
whereas the method of determining design right infringement is characterized 
by a determination not only based on the common points between the 
plaintiff’s form and the defendant’s form but also based on comparison of 
their overall impressions that takes into account their differences as well. If 
so, even if the idea to narrow the scope of copyright protection based on the 
level of creativeness were adopted, a determination of copyright infringement 
that places diff erences outside the consideration would not be consistent with 
a determination of design right infringement resulting from comparison of 
overall impressions that takes diff erences into consideration.
In other words, the already developed arguments about detriments caused 
by the copyright protection and those about their avoidability do not provide a 
solution to the issue of substantive confl ict—what kind of impact the general 
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recognition of the copyright protection for applied art could have on the states 
and features of protection under the Design Act that is already formed.
In order to look into such issue of substantive confl ict, it would be necessary 
to substantively compare the states and features of protection under the Design 
Act and the states and features of protection under the Copyright Act by 
relativizing the actual conditions of their respective subject matter of protection 
and scopes of protection from viewpoints that enable mutual comparison. 
Thus, the following part attempts to substantively compare a part of the states 
and features of protection under the two Acts based on specific appeal/trial 
decisions of the Japan Patent Offi  ce (JPO) and court judgments, by focusing on 
the way of understanding the subject matter of the respective exclusive rights, 
which can be considered as the basis of the states and features of protection.
III. Subject matter of design right and subject matter of copyright
The essence common to the Design Act and the Copyright Act is to protect 
the “creation” of forms or expressions. Then, what are the criteria that actually 
demarcate the “creation” protected under these two Acts? The following part 
studies the criteria of first the Design Act, and then the Copyright Act, with 
focus on determinations made in practice. The underlines in the citations were 
added by the author.
1. Diff erence that demarcates the “creation” under the Design Act
1) Novelty and “creation”
The Design Act provides that designs similar to publicly known designs are 
not protected (novelty requirement: Article 3, paragraph (1), item (iii) of the 
Design Act). Therefore, similarity with a publicly known design is one of the 
criteria based on which the Design Act demarcates “creation,” which is the 
subject matter.
According to the current Examination Guidelines for Design (as revised 
on March 19, 2020) (III.2.1/2.2.2.7), determination of this similarity is made 
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by finding and evaluating common points and different points in the forms 
of a design and a publicly known design. As common points cannot establish 
novelty (dissimilarity), the question will be the evaluation of “diff erent points.” 
A criterion in this evaluation is “the extent to which the forms” of the diff erent 
points “draw attention” of consumers (III.2.1/2.2.2.6) when compared with 
the publicly known design. This “extent to which the forms draw attention” is 
evaluated from the viewpoint of the size, position, etc. of the diff erent points 
in the entire design (III.2.1/2.2.2.6(1)), or from the viewpoint of “how diff erent 
the shape, etc. is from other generally seen shapes, etc. or the level of the 
creative value of the shape, etc.” (III.2.1/2.2.2.6(2)).
In short, according to the Examination Guidelines, the sole factors that 
establish novelty of a design are the “different points” in the forms of the 
design and a publicly known design, and their evaluation in light of “attention” 
of consumers, both of which can be regarded as objective consideration factors. 
The abovementioned Examination Guidelines also refer to a “creative value,” 
but in the determination of this “value,” there is no room for subjective factors, 
such as the personality of the creator which is required to satisfy the later-
mentioned “creativeness” requirement for a work. This point is also clear from 
the fact that the Examination Guidelines (III.2.1/2.2.1) state, in relation to 
the entity determining the similarity, that “… the determination will be made 
based on the objective impression that consumers (including traders) will have 
when the designs are observed, while eliminating the subject perspective of the 
creator in creating the design.”
Such characteristic of determination on novelty based on evaluation of 
objective “diff erent points” in the forms can also be easily observed in actual 
JPO appeal/trial decisions as shown below.
For example, let us look at the JPO Appeal Decision, November 7, 2013, 
Appeal No. 2013-7291, “Sports tights,” in which the JPO found novelty in 
relation to sports tights. With regard to designs of sports tights both comprising 
strip-shaped designs (Figures 1 and 2), the JPO found novelty in the filed 
partial design, making statements including the following: “… is a diff erence 
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in the shape near the front and the shape near the back in the mode of each 
strip-shaped part; the two belt-shaped parts near the front of the solid-line 
parts of the present application are wider at the upper part, becoming narrower 
toward the lower part, while the belt-shaped part near the back has the shape 
of a thin approximately isosceles triangle, but in the cited corresponding part, 
the strip-shaped part near the front has an approximately trapezoidal shape, 
while the strip-shaped part near the back has a triangular shape, suggesting 
that their shapes diff er substantially, and their diff erence is regarded to have a 
large infl uence on the determination of similarity between the two parts…” The 
basis for finding the novelty was solely different points, such as the number 
and directions of the strip-shaped designs, the presence or absence of curves, 
colors, and changes in widths.
Figure 1: Design in the application 
(Reg. No. 1492378)
Figure 2: Cited design
Next, let us examine the JPO Appeal Decision, June 27, 2017, Appeal No. 
2017-3557, “Hair ornament,” in which the JPO found novelty in relation to an 
ornament. With regard to designs of hair ornaments both comprising leaves-like 
decorations and a dotted net lace part (Figures 3 and 4), the JPO found novelty 
in the filed design, making statements including the following: “regarding 
the mode of the leaves-like decorations …, the design in the application 
wherein 13 thick, small leaves-like decorations with clear folds are arranged 
in three dimensions gives a sharp impression, while the cited design wherein 
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12 large, non-thick, roundish leaves-like decorations with non-conspicuous 
folds are arranged rather fl atly gives a soft impression, and their impressions 
in appearance clearly diff er…”; “regarding the dotted mode …, … the design 
in the application wherein … dot is small and has a rather bright tone gives a 
light and delicate impression, while the cited design wherein … dot is large and 
has a dark tone gives a rather heavy impression, and it can be said that the two 
designs give diff erent impressions, so their diff erences aff ect, though slightly, 
the determination of similarity of the two designs.” The basis for fi nding the 
novelty was solely “diff erent points” in the forms of the leaves-like decorations 
and the dotted pattern.
Figure 3: Design in the application 
(Reg. No. 1586060)
Figure 4: Cited design
2) Creative diffi  culty and “creation”
As discussed above, the substance of a requirement for demarcating 
“creation” of a design under the Japanese Design Act (novelty requirement) 
is construed to be objective “different points” from publicly known designs. 
Then, how is the substance of the other requirement—creative diffi  culty (Article 
3, paragraph (2) of the Design Act)—construed?
First, unlike in the case of the novelty requirement, the Examination 
Guidelines (III.2.2.3) do not indicate consideration factors for evaluation of 
the creative diffi  culty requirement. However, they merely show categories of 
creation that lack creative diffi  culty, such as “replacement,” and mention that 
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each category of creation is an “ordinary technique” as the basis for the lack 
of creative difficulty. Therefore, the criteria or the consideration factors for 
evaluation are unknown as to the types of cases in which creative diffi  culty is 
affi  rmed.
How have JPO appeal/trial decisions and court judgments construed this 
point?
For example, the JPO Appeal Decision, February 18, 2016, Appeal No. 
2015-16053, “Undershirt,” stated as follows in affirming creative difficulty 
for an undershirt design (Figure 5): “… the form wherein, at the joint parts 
between the front body piece and the back body piece below both underarms, 
the body pieces overlap and are affixed to the front body piece on the inner 
side and the back body piece on the outer side and the fabric edge of the back 
body piece showing up to the position slightly toward the front side, is a form 
not observed before the filing of the present application, and the position of 
the joint part of an undershirt is generally set in the middle of the front-back 
direction …, so although the extent to which the position of the edge part of 
the back body piece is moved toward the front side is not so large, it cannot be 
regarded as being an extent of having added an ordinary modifi cation.”
In other words, this appeal decision affi  rmed creative diffi  culty on the basis 
of the “diff erent points” from a publicly known form (Figure 6) in terms of the 
overlapping order of the front body piece and the back body piece at the joint 
part and the positioning of the joint part toward the front side. The creative 
diffi  culty under Article 3, paragraph (2) of the Design Act is determined from 
the viewpoint of a person skilled in the art having skills concerning designs in 
the industry in which the product to the design is to be manufactured or sold 
(Examination Guidelines III.2.2.2). However, at least no trace is observed to try 
to fi nd subjective factors such as the personality of the creator in the “diff erent 
points,” as can be seen in the idea under the Copyright Act (discussed later).
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Figure 5: Design in the application
(Reg. No. 1548480)
Figure 6: Cited design (partial) 
(Reg. No. 1294803)
Furthermore, the idea of seeking the basis for creative difficulty solely in 
objective “diff erent points” from publicly known forms can also be observed in 
court judgments.
In litigation for rescinding a JPO trial decision in which the plaintiff  claimed 
invalidity of a registered design of a numerical display form on pachinko and 
slot machines (Figure 9), the Intellectual Property High Court Judgment, July 9, 
2015, “Pachinko and slot machine display unit,” stated as follows concerning 
“diff erent points” of a 90-degree rotated L-shaped numerical display form from 
publicly known designs (Figure 10), and affirmed creative difficulty of the 
display form: “… the 90-degree rotated L-shaped group of numerical display 
parts relating to this diff erent point …, that is, the form of the small numerical 
display parts, cannot be seen in any of the cited partial designs …. In addition, 
it is difficult to find that this 90-degree rotated L-shaped form is based on 
an ordinary technique or that it can be created without requiring particular 
creativity…” In this case again, the basis for fi nding “creation” in the 90-degree 
rotated L-shaped form was merely the “diff erent points” from publicly known 
forms per se.
76 最先端技術関連法研究（国士舘大学）第 19号（2020）65-87
Figure 9: Registered design 
(Reg. No. 1264441)
Figure 10: Cited design (partial)
 
While it is infringement litigation, in a case of dispute over creative diffi  culty 
of a registered design of the heat dissipation part of lighing equipment, the 
Osaka High Court Judgment, September 5, 2019, “Lighting equipment for 
inspection,” affirmed the creative difficulty based on the same “differences” 
as those based on which if affi  rmed novelty. Specifi cally, in this case, both the 
novelty requirement and the creative diffi  culty requirement were examined in 
relation to the same publicly known designs, and the “differences” from the 
publicly known designs which established novelty were also recognized as 
“diff erences” for establishing creative diffi  culty. This suggests that the basis for 
creative diffi  culty of a design is substantively no diff erent from “diff erences” 
based on which novelty can be affi  rmed.
In addition, in litigation for rescinding a JPO appeal decision in which 
creative difficulty of a filed design of a handy masher was disputed, the 
Intellectual Property High Court Judgment, November 26, 2019, “Nozzle 
for extruded food,” denied creative difficulty of the filed design in relation 
to publicly known forms of identical and similar products. In this case, the 
expressly indicated basis for the denial was only the point that the fi led design 
was “merely created by …” a publicly known form “by using an ordinary 
technique for a person skilled in the art.” The implication of the term “merely” 
here is not necessarily clear. However, it is assumed to imply that there are 
minor or hardly any “diff erences” when compared with a publicly known form. 
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After all, the criterion for determination of creative diffi  culty is construed to be 
the “diff erences” from publicly known forms per se.
The above review of JPO appeal/trial decisions and court judgments with 
regard to interpretation of the requirements for design protection—novelty and 
creative diffi  culty—suggests the following.
The “creation” in the forms, which is the subject matter protected under the 
Design Act, is construed to be the “diff erent points” in the forms from publicly 
known designs or motifs, per se, that are objectively identified from the 
viewpoint of consumers or a person skilled in the art, not only in relation to the 
novelty requirement, but also in relation to the creative diffi  culty requirement. 
When demarcating the “creation” in the forms to be protected under the Design 
Act, sometimes the existence of diff erent points, as well as their extent (in the 
case of novelty, “the extent to which the forms draw attention of consumers,” 
and in the case of creative diffi  culty, “the fact that the forms are not ordinary 
to a person skilled in the art”), are questioned. However, it was diffi  cult to read 
from the contents of the abovementioned JPO appeal/trial decisions and court 
judgments an approach to search for factors other than the diff erent points, that 
is, other factors a lack of which would impede evaluation of “creation” even if 
diff erent points were found to exist.
Thus, it may be reasonable to say that the criterion for demarcating the 
“creation” in the forms that is protected under the the Design Act is the 
diff erence from publicly known forms.
2. Personality that demarcates “creation” under the Copyright Act
1) Personality as the substance of creativeness
As can be seen from the fact that the Japanese Copyright Act defines its 
subject matter—a work—as “a creatively produced expression of thoughts 
or sentiments …” (Article 2, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Copyright Act), 
creativeness is one of the requirements for a work. The substance of this 
creativeness has generally been construed to mean the “personality” of the 
creator since the past.(12) If so, in order to relativize the subject matter of design 
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right to the subject matter of copyright in relation to its “creation,” it would be 
required to compare the “personality” criterion demarcating the “creation” of a 
work with the “diff erence” criterion demarcating the “creation” of a design.
Let us study this point based on a few court judgments.
The first case is the Osaka District Court Judgment, February 25, 2010, 
“Stuff ed cats” case, in which the court examined the creativeness of stuff ed cats 
(Figure 11). The court denied creativeness of the trunk part of the stuff ed toys, 
stating as follows: “While all of the plaintiff ’s products use a cat as a motif, … 
the plaintiff ’s products merely have their trunks gently curved in resemblance 
to the posture mentioned above, which a cat takes when it threatens others or 
the like, and it is diffi  cult to fi nd any particular creation involved therewith”; “… 
the trunks of the stuff ed toys of the plaintiff ’s products are thinner compared to 
those of general cats, but the extent is not extreme, and it is within an ordinary 
range of expression… it can be said that the four legs are expressed long in 
light of the overall balance…, but they should also be considered to fall within 
an ordinary range of expression.”
As long as the form of the stuff ed toy is only made to “resemble the posture” 
of an actual cat, strictly speaking, there should be different points from an 
actual cat. However, such different points seem not to be even taken into 
consideration in recognizing “creation” of a work. This point can be indicated 
as a characteristic that diff ers from the case of the Design Act which, even in 
the case of “creation” of a design that uses a natural object, allows room for 
examination of whether the design represents the shapes, etc. of that natural 
object “almost as they are” (Examination Guidelines for Design III.2.2.6.7). 
In addition, the diff erent points from an actual cat in terms of the thinness of 
the trunk and the length of the four legs are also difficult to be evaluated as 
“creation” under the Copyright Act unless they are “extreme.” In any case, it 
is assumed to be diffi  cult to establish “creation” of a work based on diff erent 
points from publicly known forms per se.
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Figure 11: Plaintiff ’s product Figure 12: Plaintiff ’s star chart
A judgment which clearly indicated that “personality,” which establishes 
“creation” of a work, is a factor other than “different points” from publicly 
known forms (existing expressions) is the Osaka District Court Judgment, 
April 18, 2013, “Star chart” case, wherein the court denied copyrightability 
of a star chart. The court stated as follows regarding the expression of the 
Milky Way, etc. depicted on the plaintiff ’s star chart (Figure 12), and denied its 
creativeness: “… star charts produced by other companies … include several 
charts that depict the Milky Way in similar colors … as the sky, in the same 
manner as the plaintiff’s star chart. In addition, the shapes (outlines) of the 
Milky Way depicted on those star charts and the plaintiff ’s star chart diff er in 
detailed parts, but are found to resemble each other. Furthermore, there are no 
concrete assertions or proof indicating that the diff erent points in detailed parts 
relating to the shapes (outlines) of the Milky Way depicted on the plaintiff ’s 
star chart and star charts produced by other companies represent some 
characteristics or personality in expression.”
Creativeness of the plaintiff ’s star chart was denied because, while “diff erent 
points” from expressions in existing star charts could be found with regard to 
the expression of the Milky Way, there were no assertions or proof indicating 
“personality” in the expression. In other words, the “personality,” which 
establishes “creation” of a work, is a fact other than “different points” from 
existing items of expression.
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2) Personality and concepts of reproduction and adaptation
The fact that, mere diff erence is not enough to establish “creation” that is 
subject to copyright protection, and that personality is also required as another 
additional factor, can be understood not only from court judgments on works, 
which are the subject matter, as mentioned above, but also from the structure 
of the provisions of the Copyright Act, which provides for “reproduction” and 
“adaptation” as separate concepts.
Reproduction means physical replication (Article 2, paragraph (1), item 
(xv) of the Copyright Act), and it is construed to include not only mere slavish 
imitations, but also an act of making alteration that makes some modifi cation, 
addition, or omission.(13) On the other hand, adaptation means an act of creating 
a derivative work (Article 2, paragraph (1), item (xi) of the Copyright Act), 
and it is construed to be an act of adding a new creative element by making 
alteration such as modifi cation, addition, or omission, while maintaining the 
essential characteristics of the existing item of expression (work).(14)
If so, reproduction and adaptation do not diff er in that they are both an act 
of making alteration such as modification, addition, omission to an existing 
work. However, alteration that remains as “reproduction” and alteration 
that creates a new work (derivative work) as “adaptation” would need to be 
clearly distinguished. Conversely, to create a new work, an act of alteration 
that remains within the scope of “reproduction” is not enough, and an act of 
alteration that adds a creative element, which is suffi  cient to be evaluated as 
“adaptation,” will be required.
In other words, under the Copyright Act, an alteration or diff erence that can 
be evaluated as addition of a “new creative element” is required in order to create 
a derivative work, that is, new “creation,” based on an existing expression. An 
alteration or diff erence that lacks addition of such element is not evaluated as 
“creation,” and its outcome will merely be a reproduction.
It can be construed that the personality which the two court judgments 
introduced above sought as a factor other than different points in finding 
“creation” is this creative element. That is to say, the fact that mere diff erence 
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is not enough to establish “creation” of a work, and that personality is also 
required as another additional factor, can also be considered to be a logical 
outcome of the relationship between the concepts of reproduction and 
adaptation.
The Tokyo District Court Judgment, July 27, 2016, “Swimava manual” is a 
recent court judgment that clearly expresses this point. With regard to a dispute 
over a reproduction relationship between the plaintiff’s illustration (Figure 
13) and the defendant’s illustration (Figure 14) in their product manuals, the 
court affirmed the reproduction relationship (infringement of the right of 
reproduction) after fi rst indicating the creativeness of the common points and 
their coincidence, and then stated as follows concerning the different points 
between the two: “For the different points including … above, creativeness 
cannot be found even by combining these points. If so, the defendant’s 
illustration 4 … is regarded as not adding a new creative expression.”; 
“According to the above, the defendant’s illustration 4 should be considered to 
constitute reproduction of the plaintiff ’s illustration 4.”
In other words, even if “different points” existed between the two 
illustrations, as long as the different points are not found to add a new 
creative element, the two illustrations would continue to have a reproduction 
relationship (no new “creation” relationship would be found).
Figure 13: Plaintiff ’s illustration Figure 14: Defendant’s illustration
Then, in the case of a work, what kind of alteration needs to be added in 
order to recognize “creation” that establishes “personality”?
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A case that provides a hint on this point is the Tokyo District Court 
Judgment, March 23, 2006, Hanji, no. 1946, p. 101, “Edo archaeological 
research encyclopedia” case, in which copyrightability (recognition as 
derivative works: recognition as constituting adaptation) was disputed for 
replicas (Figure 16) of Ukiyo-e (Japanese woodblock print) originals (Figure 
15). With regard to the issue “creativeness of replicas assuming the diff erent 
points between the originals and the replicas,” the court stated as follows: 
“…even when a replica producer makes a replica by copying the original by 
hand, … even if slight modifi cation, addition or omission, or alteration, etc., is 
made to the concrete expressions, … the diff erences would not be regarded as 
new creative expressions made by the replica producer … if only the creative 
expressions felt from the original are merely perceived from the replica, 
the replica should be regarded as a reproduction of the original.” The court 
held that, if no “new creative expressions” exist in the “diff erences” with the 
existing expression (original), it is diffi  cult to recognize copyrightability (the 
replica remains as a reproduction of the original). Then, the court indicated, 
for example, as follows about a case where “differences” from the original 
establish “creation” of the replica: “ … while the original 3 is a playful picture 
combining a scene described in Kyoka (Japanese short comic poem) about a 
noble person engaging in the work of a pottery repairer, the plaintiff ’s drawing 
3 depicts a pottery repairer as a townsperson with an aim to draw the customs 
and lifestyle of townspeople in the Edo Period, and plainly illustrates a scene of 
a pottery repairer engaging in the work of pottery repair …., so in this regard, 
it should be said that the thought of the deceased A (replica producer: a note by 
the author) is being expressed in a creative manner…”
Specifically, creativeness of the replica could be established because an 
original idea (thought) of the replica producer could be found in the diff erent 
points from the original. In other words, it can also be construed that, if a so-
called “change in the motif” is found in the expression of a different point 
between the replica and the original, creativeness is recognized for that 
diff erent point.
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Figure 15: Ukiyo-e original Figure 16: Replica
IV. Relative ease of protection for “creation” under the Design Act
From the above study of case examples, though they may have been 
limited in number, the following findings can be derived with regard to the 
relativization between the “creation” protected under the Design Act and that 
protected under the Copyright Act as an interpretation currently valid in Japan:
(i) “Creation” of a design is demarcated by substantively different criteria 
from those for “creation” of a work.
(ii) While the criterion for the former is “diff erence” from publicly known 
forms per se, the latter requires not only “difference” from existing 
expressions, but also “personality” as another evaluation factor.
(iii) The “creation” of a design and that of a work are demarcated based on 
diff erent criteria or principles, so there is a possibility that their meanings 
would diff er from each other even if a common concept were applied to 
them.
(iv) If “personality” required for “creation” of a work is regarded as an 
additional requirement to “diff erence” required for “creation” of a design, 
it should be said that the requirements for protection for a work are higher 
than those for protection for a design in terms of protection for “creation” 
of expressions or forms.
If these study results are to be understood in a more rough and simplifi ed 
manner from the viewpoint of comparison between the states and features 
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of protection under the two Acts, it could be said that design right protection 
is relatively easier and copyright protection is relatively more difficult to 
obtain, in terms of protection for “creation” of forms. Indeed, it would not be 
appropriate to compare the level or the high or low of “creation” of a design 
and that of a work without examining the variance between the entities making 
the determination on the respective “creation,” as the capacity of observation 
and attention may diff er depending on the entity making the determination (for 
example, if determination is made from the viewpoint of the creator, “creation” 
will generally likely to be recognized also in points that are not easily 
noticeable by consumers who are not the creator). However, without having 
to make such comparison in level, demarcation of “creation” of a design does 
not require the “personality” that is required for demarcation of “creation” of 
a work. Thus, it seems to be already clear from the kinds and number of the 
consideration factors that “creation” of a design is more easily protected as 
compared to “creation” of a work.
In fact, it cannot be denied that design protection, which requires the 
application, examination, and registration procedures, gives a seeming 
impression of being hard to access as a means of obtaining an exclusive right 
as compared to copyright, which arises automatically when the work is created 
(Article 17, paragraph (2) of the Copyright Act). Because of this, concerns have 
been indicated against arguments to expand copyright protection to applied art 
to the eff ect that incentives for obtainment of design right would be lost due to 
the ease of obtainment of copyright.
However, if a focus is placed on not the procedures required for obtainment 
of the right but on the substantive requirements for protection, as in the study 
above, it should be said that copyright protection is relatively more difficult 
to obtain as compared to design right protection, particularly in relation to 
“creation,” which is the core of the subject matter. The relative difficulty of 
obtaining copyright protection can also be observed in the Intellectual Property 
High Court Judgment, October 13, 2016, “Chopsticks for children” case, 
where the court denied copyrightability of a design of chopsticks for children 
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(Figure 17) for which design registration has been recognized, stating that it is 
diffi  cult to fi nd involvement of “some creative ingenuity that could be subject 
to aesthetic appreciation.”
Figure 17: Design Reg. No. 1531558
V. Future tasks
With the aim of clarifying a part of the issue of substantive confl ict—what 
kind of impact the general recognition of the copyright protection for applied 
art could have on the states and features of protection under the Design Act 
that is already formed—this article has attempted to substantively compare and 
study the way of understanding the subject matter that serves as the basis of the 
states and features of protection under the Design Act and the Copyright Act.
The study merely covered limited viewpoints, not only in terms of the 
overall picture of the confl ict, but also in terms of comparison of the way of 
understanding the subject matter, which was a point of focus in this study. 
In particular, to clarify the issue of substantive conflict, it would be an 
unavoidable task to further analyze the way of understanding the scope of 
protection after the recognition of the right, that is, to analyze the method and 
criteria for determination of infringement.
In order to examine the validity of general recognition of the copyright 
protection for applied art, it would be essential to further clarify such issue of 
substantive confl ict between the Design Act and the Copyright Act.
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